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COMMENT
The Battle for Baby Jessica: A Conflict of
Best Interests
BERNADETTE WEAVER-CATALANAt
INTRODUCTION
Romance fails us and so do friendships, but the relationship of parent and
child, less noisy than all others, remains indelible and indestructible, the
strongest relationship upon this earth.1
Precisely defining the "parent-child" relationship held the at-
tention of the nation during the Summer of 1993. Indeed, the
"summer of children" 2 brought to the media forefront the legal
battles of Kimberly Mays, s Gregory K.4 and, most notably, the cus-
tody dispute between Jessica DeBoer's biological parents, Cara and
Dan Schmidt,5 and the couple who raised her from birth, Roberta
t J.D., May 1995, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law.
1. THEODOR REIK, A PSYCHOLOGIST LOOKS AT LovE 260 (1944). The late Theodor Reik, a
contemporary and associate of Sigmund Freud, examines the origin and nature of love, in-
cluding the love that exists between parent and child.
2. Richard Cohen, Class Action, WASH. POST MAG., Sept. 12, 1993, at W9. Cohen ex-
plores the underlying class biases that exist in the context of child custody cases. He refers
to the "summer of children," since there were several high-profile child custody cases, in-
cluding the 1993 case involving Jessica.
3. Kimberly Mays successfully sued to terminate the parental rights of her biological
parents after it was revealed that she and another child were switched in a Florida Hospital
nursery at birth. When the child they raised as their daughter, Arlena, died of a congenital
heart defect in 1988, the Twiggs pursued visitation with their biological daughter. Kimberly
objected and a legal dispute followed. Mays v. Twigg, 543 So. 2d 241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1989).
4. Gregory Kinsley attempted to "divorce" his biological mother who had abandoned
him to foster care for most of his life. Gregory initiated the proceeding so that he would be
freed for adoption by the Russ family, who was acting as his foster family. Although the
Orange County Circuit Court granted his petition, the Florida Court of Appeals reversed the
decision, saying that Gregory, as an unemancipated minor, lacked the legal capacity to bring
such an action. However, the error was deemed harmless because similar termination peti-
tions were also filed by Gregory's guardian ad litem and foster mother. Kingsley v. Kingsley,
623 So. 2d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
5. Cara Clausen married Dan Schmidt, Jessica's biological father, in April 1992.
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and Jan DeBoer. The highly publicized fight for Jessica6 and the
resulting decision that awarded custody to the Schmidts has raised
many more questions than it has answered about the status of
birthparents, adoptive parents and children.
The struggle for Jessica was framed in terms of parental rights
versus the best interests of the child. While such a concrete depic-
tion of the custody issues makes good media copy, the legal stan-
dards involved are not so simply expressed or applied. As noted by
legal scholar Henry Foster7 over twenty years ago, parental rights
and the best interests of the child "constitute the black letter law
of custody."" Biology and parental fitness, or the "parental rights"
doctrine, 9 typically determine a contest between a natural parent
and a third party, while the "best interests" standard ° is reserved
6. "Jessica" is the name that the DeBoers gave the child, though the courts generally
referred to her as Baby Girl Clausen. After the litigation was concluded, the Schmidts
renamed her Anna. The Schmidts reportedly "phased-in" her new name over a period of
months, first calling the child Jessica, then Jessianna, and ultimately Anna. Michele Ingras-
sia & Karen Springen, She's Not Baby Jessica Anymore, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 24, 1994, at 60.
7. The late Henry H. Foster, Jr., was a Professor of Law at New York University and a
former chairman of the Family Law Section of the American Bar Association. He co-au-
thored HENRY H. FOSTER, JR. ET AL., LAW AND THE FAmILY-NEw YORK (2d ed. 1986) and
MORRIS PLOSCOWE, ET AL., FAmY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1972).
8. Henry H. Foster, Jr., Adoption and Child Custody: Best Interests of the Child?, 22
BUFF. L. REV. 1, 3 (1972) (urging that neither parental rights doctrine or best interests stan-
dard should be applied inflexibly or automatically).
9. The doctrine of parental rights dictates that a biological parent is entitled to custody
of his or her child unless he or she is shown to be unfit. Biological parents who cannot or
will not fulfill their responsibilities as biological parents can have their parental rights ter-
minated. The most common grounds for termination are child abuse, abandonment, neglect
and general unfitness. Once the rights of the biological parents have been terminated, the
child is free for adoption. For a discussion of the parental rights doctrine, see Foster, supra
note 8; James G. O'Keefe, The Need To Consider Children's Rights in Biological Parent v.
Third Party Custody Disputes, 67 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 1077 (1991) (arguing that the use of
the parental rights doctrine as a standard in deciding child custody is no longer realistic);
Virginia Mixon Swindell, Comment, Children's Participation in Custodial and Parental
Right Determinations, 31 Hous. L. REV. 659 (1994) (advocating that the rights of children
should be paramount in the laws that concern them); Note, Alternatives to "Parental
Right" in Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties, 73 YALE L.J. 151 (1963) (citing
third-party custody disputes as offering the greatest opportunity to separate child-oriented
from parent-oriented factors in custody dispositions) [hereinafter Alternatives to "Parental
Right']. The grounds for termination of parental rights under Iowa law are discussed infra
note 46.
10. The United States Supreme Court has held that the right of a fit parent to the
custody of a minor child is a fundamental liberty interest. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745 (1982). Therefore, although the child's best interests are a determining factor in a con-
test between natural parents, when the dispute is between a parent and a nonparent, the
child's best interests are presumed to be served by an award of custody to a parent. There-
fore, an award of custody to a third party may be warranted only if parental unfitness,
abandonment, neglect or some other extraordinary circumstance would substantially effect
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for disputes between two natural parents.1
The parental rights doctrine is often condemned for mechani-
cally reducing the custody decision to the presence or absence of
biological ties "without regard to the psychological consequences to
the child.' 1 2 The best interests of the child standard, on the other
hand, has been criticized as "an amorphous concept which may
serve as a basis for rationalization of any result."'13 Regardless of
how a party asserts his or her custody claim, "often, custody dis-
putes degenerate into adversary contests between embittered par-
ties both of whom lose sight of the child's welfare.'
14
Ironically, arguing for the consideration of the child's best in-
terests may become less an altruistic pursuit of justice than the
legal means to an end. The Supreme Court of Michigan's per
curiam opinion rendered in DeBoer v. Schmidt (In Re Baby Girl
Clausen)' recognized this, ordering Jessica's surrender to her bio-
logical parents, the Schmidts:
To a perhaps unprecedented degree among the matters that reach this
Court, these cases have been litigated through fervent emotional appeals,
with counsel and the adult parties pleading that their only interests are to
do what is best for the child, who is herself blameless for this protracted
litigation and the grief that it has caused. ... It is now time for the adults
to move beyond saying that their only concern is the welfare of the child
and to put those words into action .... 16
This Comment does not support either side of the nature ver-
sus nurture battle but, does expose the dangers inherent to either
the child's welfare.
Some courts have begun to consider the child's interests in security and continuity of
care as one such circumstance that may warrant denial of parental custody. Carol A. Crocca,
Annotation, Continuity of Residence as Factor in Contest Between Parent and NonParent
For Custody of Child Who Has Been Residing With Nonparent-Modern Status, 15 A.L.R.
5TH 692 (1993). For a detailed discussion of the best interests standard, see Jon Elster,
Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 1 (1987)
(arguing that following the best interests standard may be unjust toward the parents) [here-
inafter Elster, Solomonic Judgments]; Foster, supra note 8; Robert H. Mnookin, Child Cus-
tody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CoNTEMP.
PROBs. 226, 262 (1975) (suggesting that all available alternatives have more disadvantages
than the indeterminate best interests standard).
11. See Foster, supra note 8, at 3.
12. Id. at 4.
13. Id. at 2.
14. Id. at 15.
15. 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1992).
16. Id. at 668.
17. The phrase "nature versus nurture" inherently refers to the fundamentals of self-
definition. Are we primarily a product of environment or genetics? Those who advocate the
parental rights doctrine are convinced that children's best interests are served by being
1995]
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position. Part I examines the facts behind the emotional battle for
Jessica's custody and the court proceedings that culminated in her
return to the Schmidts. Part II explores the "black letter" stan-
dards used to determine custody, the parental rights doctrine and
the best interests of the child standard, and whether these stan-
dards have the dichotomous objectives with which they are often
portrayed. Part III offers insight into the public perception of the
battle for Jessica and discusses, in particular, why public opinion
was so heavily skewed in the DeBoers' favor.
I. THE FACTS
This case is, we observe thankfully, an unusual one.18
"Baby Girl Clausen" was born in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, on Feb-
ruary 8, 1991."' Approximately forty hours later her biological
mother, Cara Clausen, relinquished her rights to the child. By sign-
ing the release of custody form presented to her by an attorney
representing the prospective adoptive parents, Jan and Roberta
DeBoer, 20 Cara consented to a "complete severance and extin-
guishment" of her relationship with the child.21 Cara, unmarried at
the time of the child's birth, named Scott Seefeldt as the baby's
father.2 Scott executed a release of custody form four days later,
relinquishing his parental rights.23 After both biological parents
had released. their rights to the child, she was now free for
adoption.24
On February 25, the DeBoers, residents of Ann Arbor, Michi-
gan, petitioned the Iowa Juvenile Court for adoption of the child
they called Jessica. 5 In the same proceedings, Cara's and Scott's
parental rights were officially terminated.2
Having been granted custody during the pendency of the
adoption proceeding, the DeBoers returned with Jessica to their
reared by their biological parents. Those who advocate the best interests standard believe
that environment (nurture) is the dominant factor in self-determination. For a more de-
tailed discussion of nature and nurture and its effect on children, see infra Part II.
18. In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 240 (Iowa 1992).
19. In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 652 (Mich. 1993).
20. Id. at 651 n.1.
21. IOWA CODE ANN. § 600A.2 (16) (West Supp. 1994).
22. Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d at 652.
23. Id.
24. Under IoWA CODE ANN. § 600.3(2) (1993), "[a]n adoption petition shall not be filed
until a termination of parental rights has been accomplished." Id.
25. Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d at 652.
26. Id.
586 [Vol. 43
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Michigan home. The proposed adoption appeared to be going as
planned. Even Clausen gave them her best wishes, writing them a
letter that read: "I know you will treasure her and surround her
with love, support her, encourage her to dream, to reach for the
stars ... God bless. 28
Second thoughts soon eroded these positive sentiments. Cara
attended a support group meeting of Concerned United
Birthparents29 and listened to other mothers relate their sorrow at
giving up their babies.30 Within two weeks she filed a motion in the
Iowa Juvenile Court to revoke her release of custody.3 1 According
to her affidavit, Cara had lied when she named Scott as the father
of her child; the actual father was her ex-boyfriend, Daniel
Schmidt,3 2 a co-worker at the Iowa shipping factory where Cara
worked.33 Cara had lied about the identity of the baby's father be-
27. Throughout the custody proceedings, Jessica remained with the DeBoers pending
the outcome of the litigation. She was transferred to the custody of the Schmidts and re-
turned to Iowa on August 2, 1993, only after the Supreme Court denied the DeBoers'
appeal.
28. ROBBY DEBoER, LOSING JESSICA 17 (1994) [hereinafter LOSING JESSICA].
29. Concerned United Birthparents (CUB) is a national support and search organiza-
tion for those affected by adoption. The group has local chapters across the country.
Founded in 1976, the group urges open adoption-in which biological parents are kept
abreast of the child's welfare and, when the child reaches majority, the biological mother
and child have the legal option to contact each other. CUB members advocate that women
facing the choice of adoption or keeping their infants should provide their children with the
benefit of their experiences.
The group has received much criticism, most notably in a 1993 article in The New
Yorker that profiled Jessica's case. The article portrayed the group as staunchly anti-adop-
tion. Lucinda Franks, Annals of Law: The War for Baby Clausen, NEW YORKER, Mar. 22,
1993, at 56. Roberta DeBoer has stated that she viewed CUB as the ultimate "villain" in the
legal battle that took place between the DeBoers and the Schmidts for Jessica's custody,
claiming that overzealous CUB members convinced the birth mother to regain her parental
rights. LOSING JESSICA, supra note 28, at 194-95.
30. Nancy Gibbs, In Whose Best Interest?, TIME, July 19, 1993, at 44.
31. In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 651-52 (Mich. 1993). IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 600A.4 (West 1981 & West Supp. 1994) provides:
Either a parent who has signed a release of custody, or a nonsigning parent, may,
at any time prior to the entry of an order terminating parental rights, request...
revocation of any release of custody previously executed by either parent. If such
request is ... within ninety-six hours of the time such parent signed a release of
custody, the juvenile court should order the release revoked. Otherwise, the juve-
nile court shall order the release or releases revoked only upon clear and convinc-
ing evidence that good cause exists for revocation. Good cause for revocation in-
cludes but is not limited to a showing that the release was obtained by fraud,
coercion, or misrepresentation of law or fact which was material for its execution.
Id. (emphasis added).
32. Id.
33. Richard Victor, attorney for Jessica DeBoer, explained that Dan and Cara worked
together at an Iowa shipping plant; he as a truck driver and she as a dispatcher. Crossfire
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cause she was dating Scott when she found out that she was preg-
nant, and "did not want to create problems by appearing to have
another man's baby. 3 4
On February 27, Cara told Daniel Schmidt that she suspected
he was the father of the child.35 Ten days later, Daniel met with an
attorney to determine how he could assert his parental rights over
the baby girl.38 Although he would be unsure whether he was the
child's father until court-ordered blood tests established his pater-
nity, Daniel did not delay action. On March 12, 1991, he filed a
request to vacate the termination order; on March 18, he filed an
affidavit of paternity.3 7
The Iowa Juvenile Court quickly stopped both biological par-
ents' attempts to obtain custody of the child. Cara's motion to re-
voke her release was dismissed on the grounds that the juvenile
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction once the adoption petition
was filed.3 8 Daniel's custody claim also was dismissed.39 Roberta
and Jan DeBoer returned to Michigan with their status as Jessica's
custodians intact.4 °
A. Procedural History: Iowa
Daniel Schmidt subsequently sought relief in the Iowa District
Court, petitioning to intervene in the adoption proceedings on the
grounds that his parental rights had not been terminated as re-
quired by Iowa law.41 The district court suspended the adoption
proceedings and ordered blood tests to establish paternity.42 As a
result of the DeBoers' objections,43 six months elapsed before the
court received results that showed a 99.9% probability that Daniel
(CNN television broadcast, Aug. 3, 1993).
34. In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 246 (Iowa 1992).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. In re Baby Girl Clausen, 501 N.W.2d 193, 194 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993), aff'd, 502
N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993).
39. Id. Though the grounds on which his claim was dismissed were not specifically
stated, it is likely that because Schmidt's rights were not terminated in the initial proceed-
ings, there was nothing for the court to reinstate-thus rendering moot Schimdt's request.
40. Id.
41. Id. IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.3(2) (1993) states: "An adoption petition shall not be
filed until a termination of parental rights has been accomplished" except in the adoption of
adults and stepchildren. Id.
42. Id.
43. Richard Victor defended these objections as the DeBoers' natural reaction after
Cara had named two different men as the father of her child. Crossfire (CNN television
broadcast, Aug. 3, 1993).
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was Jessica's father.4 These results also showed a 0% probability
that Scott Seefeldt was Jessica's father.45
On September 24, 1991, the DeBoers responded to these test
results by filing a petition to terminate Daniel's rights, challenging
his fitness as a parent.46 Their petition was based on Daniel's (1)
past history as a parent4V 7 and (2) his alleged abandonment of Jes-
sica.48 On November 4, 1991, the Iowa District Court held a bench
trial on the issues of paternity, termination of parental rights, and
adoption.49 The court held that (1) Daniel had established his pa-
ternity by a preponderance of the evidence; (2) the DeBoers failed
to establish that Daniel had abandoned Jessica or, that his paren-
tal rights should be terminated; and, therefore, (3) a best interests
analysis was immaterial.50 Ruling that the termination proceedings
were void with respect to Daniel's parental rights, the court denied
the DeBoers' request to adopt Jessica.5 1 Roberta and Jan DeBoer
were ordered to convey physical custody of the child to Daniel no
44. Baby Girl Clausen, 501 N.W.2d at 194.
45. Id.
46. Id. Generally, before parental rights may be terminated, there must be some act or
event that constitutes an express or implied relinquishment of parental authority, i.e., aban-
donment or serious neglect, conduct showing unfitness, or a knowing surrender of the child
for adoption. After such a triggering event has occurred, the child's best interests become
controlling in custody determinations. Foster, supra note 8, at 15.
Under Iowa law, parental rights can be terminated if the parent (1) has signed a release
of custody and the release has not be revoked; (2) has petitioned for the termination of their
parental rights; (3) has abandoned the child; (4) has been ordered to but has failed to finan-
cially support the child, without good cause; (5) does not object to the termination after
proper notice and reasonable opportunity to object; or (6) the parent does not object to the
termination although every reasonable effort has been made to identify, locate and give no-
tice to that parent under Iowa law. IOWA CODE ANN. § 600A.8 (1993).
47. Both the majority and the dissenting opinions of the Iowa Supreme Court noted
Daniel's "poor performance record as a parent." In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 245 (Iowa
1992). The dissent stated:
[t]he record shows he (Schmidt) has previously failed to raise or support his other
two children. He quit supporting his son, born in 1976, after two years. From 1978
to 1990 he saw him three times. He has another daughter whom he has never seen
and has failed to support. He stated the he just never took any interest in her. In
every meaningful way he abandoned them.
Id. at 247 (Snell, J., dissenting).
48. In re Baby Girl Clausen, 501 N.W.2d 193, 194 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993), af'd, 502
N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993). Abandonment of a child is grounds for termination of parental
rights in every state. Abandonment statutes generally specify a period of time after which
the state may terminate the parent's rights. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Sterilization of Men-
tally Retarded Persons: Reproductive Rights and Family Privacy, 1986 DuKE L.J. 806, 830.
49. B.G.C., 501 N.W.2d at 194.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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later than January 12, 1992.52
Meanwhile, the Iowa Court of Appeals reversed the juvenile
court's termination of Cara's parental rights, and remanded the
case for further proceedings.53 The Iowa Supreme Court granted
review of that decision and consolidated it with the DeBoers' ap-
peal of the district court's grant of custody to Daniel.54 The Iowa
Supreme Court stayed the physical custody order pending the pro-
ceedings,55 allowing Jessica to remain with the DeBoers in
Michigan.
One year after Daniel had established his paternity, the Iowa
Supreme Court affirmed both lower court decisions, rejecting the
DeBoers' assertions that a best interests analysis governed the is-
sue of termination in an adoption case.56 Writing for the majority,
Justice Larson stated the general rule that "the court may not con-
sider whether the adoption will be for the ... best interests of the
child where the parents have not consented to an adoption. '57
In compliance with the Iowa Supreme Court's decision, the
district court terminated the DeBoers' rights as temporary guardi-
ans and custodians of the child, and awarded these duties to
Daniel at a physical custody hearing on December 3, 1992." The
DeBoers refused to appear at the hearing and were found in con-
tempt of court.59
B. Procedural History: Michigan
As the DeBoers' rights were being terminated in Iowa, they
petitioned the Washtenaw County Circuit Court in Michigan, pur-
suant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), to
modify the Iowa order granting custody of Jessica to Daniel
Schmidt.60 The DeBoers asserted that Michigan had jurisdiction
52. Id.
53. Id. at 195.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992).
57. Id. at 245.
58. In re Baby Girl Clausen, 501 N.W.2d 193, 196 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993); afl'd, 502
N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993).
59. Id. at 195 n.1.
60. Id. at 195. The general purposes of the UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT
§§ 1-28, 9 U.L.A. 111-70 (1968), are:
(1) to avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of other states in
matters of child custody which ... resulted in the shifting of children from state
to state with harmful effects on their well-being.
(2) to promote cooperation among the courts of the various states, so that the one
having the closest connection and most significant evidence concerning the child's
[Vol. 43
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under the UCCJA because Jessica had resided in Michigan for all
but three weeks of her life, making Michigan her "home state"
under the UCCJA 1 The DeBoers urged that it was in Jessica's
best interests for Michigan to assume jurisdiction in the case 2 and
sought a decision that balanced the Iowa courts' rulings with a de-
termination of Jessica's best interests." The Washtenaw County
Circuit Court granted the DeBoers' petition for a preliminary in-
junction, ordering Daniel not to remove Jessica from Washtenaw
County.6
4
Daniel entered a motion for summary disposition on Decem-
ber 11, 1992, urging, among other things, that the DeBoers lacked
standing to initiate a custody dispute.6 5 His motion was denied.
Finding that it had jurisdiction to determine Jessica's best inter-
ests, the circuit court held a best interests hearing and ordered on
February 12, 1993, that Jessica was to remain with the DeBoers.66
care, protection, training and personal relationships will be able to do so; and
(3) to deter parental abductions, forum shopping and repetitive litigation, so as to
best promote stability of the home environment and secure family relationships
for the child.
Id. § 1, 9 U.L.A. at 119. Michigan adopted the UCCJA in 1975. See MicH. CoMP. LAws
§§ 600.651-673 (1993). For a discussion of the UCCJA, see Christopher Blakesley, Child
Custody-Jurisdiction and Procedure, 35 EMoRY L.J. 291 (1986) (discussing jurisdiction
and applicable procedure in the context of child custody cases).
61. Baby Girl Clausen, 501 N.W.2d at 195. The UCCJA's definition of "home state"
exists in IcH. ComP. LAws § 600.652(e) (1993):
Home state means the state in which the child immediately preceding the time
involved lived with his or her parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at
least 6 consecutive months, and in the case of a child less than 6 months old the
state in which the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned.
Id.
62. Baby Girl Clausen, 501 N.W.2d at 195. The UCCJA conveys jurisdiction on:
A court of this state which is competent to decide child custody matters...
by initial or modification decree or judgement if ... (b) It is in the best interest
of the child that a court of this state assume jurisdiction because the child and his
parents. . .have a significant connection with this state and there is available in
this state substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, pro-
tection, training, and personal relationships.
MiCH. Comp. LAws § 600.653(1)(b) (1993). The DeBoers urged that a Michigan court could
modify the Iowa custody order because the Iowa court did not substantially conform with
the UCCJA and undertake a best interests analysis. The DeBoers' reasoning was supported
by a unanimous decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court. See E.E.B. v. D.A., 446 A.2d
871 (N.J. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1210 (1983). Both the Michigan Court of Appeals and
the Michigan Supreme Court found this reasoning to be without merit. In re Baby Girl
Clausen, 501 N.W.2d 193, 197 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993), aff'd, 502 N.W.2d 649, 656 (Mich.
1993).
63. Baby Girl Clausen, 501 N.W.2d at 196.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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This determination was never challenged.6 7
Daniel did challenge the circuit court's decision, asserting that
(1) the court lacked jurisdiction to intervene because the Iowa
court's decision involved adoption, not custody under the
UCCJA;6 s (2) as a natural parent, he had a constitutional right" to
custody of his child, absent a determination that he was unfit, and
that no analysis, including that which determines the child's best
interests, can override that right;70 and (3) under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, 1 the circuit
court was obligated to recognize and enforce the Iowa court's valid
judgment. 2 Alternatively, Daniel argued, even if the circuit court
had correctly assumed jurisdiction, Roberta and Jan DeBoer
lacked standing to initiate a custody action because they were
merely third-party custodians with no legal claim to Jessica.78
On March 29, 1993, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed
the circuit court's decision, finding that the court lacked jurisdic-
tion under the UCCJA and, that under the Michigan Supreme
Court's decision in Bowie v. Arder,74 the DeBoers lacked standing
to bring a child custody action.75
After this decision, Jessica's "next friend, '7 6 Peter Darrow,
filed a complaint in the Washtenaw County Circuit Court on Jes-
67. Id.; see also In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 653 n.9 (Mich. 1993).
68. Baby Girl Clausen, 501 N.W.2d at 196; see MICH. CormP. LAWS §§ 600.651-.673
(1993).
69. In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), the Supreme Court held that under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a parent is entitled to a hearing on
fitness before his children can be taken away from him. Id.
70. Baby Girl Clausen, 501 N.W.2d at 196.
71. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
72. Baby Girl Clausen, 501 N.W.2d at 196.
73. Id. at 197.
74. 490 N.W.2d 568 (Mich. 1992) (evaluating custody claims of third parties with whom
natural parents allowed the children in question to reside for a period of time absent a
formal arrangement; holding that a third party cannot attain standing simply by asserting
that a change in custody would be in the best interests of the child, without a substantive
right to custody of that child).
75. Baby Girl Clausen, 501 N.W.2d at 197.
76. A "next friend" is "one who commences an action on behalf of a minor plaintiff and
represents such plaintiff under the supervision of the court." Powell v. Monolidis, 408
N.W.2d 525, 529 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987). Although not statutorily defined, Michigan statutes
expressly prohibit any (1) physician who performs abortions, (2) person employed by a phy-
sician or organization who performs abortions or abortion counseling and referral services,
or (3) person who serves as a board member or volunteer to such organization that provides
abortions or abortion counseling from acting as a next friend. MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN.
§ 722.902(d) (West 1993). The circuit court appointed Peter Darrow, a Washtenaw County
Attorney, as Jessica's next friend in this new suit.
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sica's behalf. The circuit court ordered that Jessica's custody re-
main unchanged pending this new action.78 Darrow's complaint re-
quested "child custody, declaratory relief and injunctive relief,"
and named both the DeBoers and the Schmidts as defendants. 9
The Supreme Court of Michigan granted the DeBoers leave to
appeal the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision as it related to the
issues of jurisdiction and standing.8 " The Schmidts were allowed to
appeal only the question of whether Darrow's complaint on behalf
of Jessica should be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which
relief could be granted.' All other proceedings were stayed pend-
ing the high court's consideration of these issues.8 2
C. The Decision
The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed the court of appeals'
decision, holding that the UCCJA and the federal Parental Kid-
napping Prevention Act deprived the Michigan courts of jurisdic-
tion over the dispute and required that the Iowa court's decision
be upheld.8 3 The court also rejected Darrow's next-friend claim on
behalf of Jessica, directing that the action be dismissed for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 4 The court
concluded that "[w]hile a child has a constitutionally protected in-
terest in family life, that interest is not independent of its parents'
[interest] in the absence of a showing that the parents are unfit."8' 5
D. Parental Rights: The Overriding Factor
As tempting as it is to resolve this highly emotional issue with one's heart,
we do not have the unbridled discretion of Solomon. Ours is a system of
law. ..
77. In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 653 (Mich. 1993). Peter Darrow had been
appointed as one of the co-guardians ad litem for Jessica in the earlier custody case. Id.
78. Id. at 653.
79. Id. Though the court later chastised this action as simply a way for people like the
DeBoers to circumvent the procedures that are required to gain standing, Richard Victor
defended the strategy: "[tihe problem is the child was victimized because of the mistakes of
the adults, and that was wrong. I represented the best interests of Jessica so that she would
have a right to a hearing regardless of the mistakes of the adults." Crossfire (CNN television
broadcast, Aug. 3, 1993).
80. Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d at 654 n.11.
81. Id. at 654 n.12.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 652.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 241 (Iowa 1992).
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Under Iowa Code section 600.3(2), "[a]n adoption petition
shall not be filed until a termination of parental rights has been
accomplished . ,,. Although a termination hearing was held on
February 25, 1991, Scott Seefeldt's parental rights were termi-
nated, not those of Daniel Schmidt.88 Because the termination of
Daniel's rights to Jessica was not accomplished, the adoption pro-
ceedings were viewed as "fatally flawed" under Iowa law.89 This
conclusion was reached despite the fact that the proceedings were
legally completed, since Scott's parental interests were "known" at
that time based on the misrepresentations of Cara Schmidt 0 The
Iowa Supreme Court explained the general rule of non-interference
with the rights of natural parents as, "simply to better the moral
and temporal welfare of the child as against an unoffending par-
ent."9 1 In order for the court to terminate Daniel's parental rights
and proceed with the DeBoers' adoption request, specific grounds
for termination had to be established.2
The DeBoers contended that Daniel's parental rights should
have been terminated because he had abandoned Jessica, which
constitutes grounds for termination under Iowa law. They as-
serted that Daniel should have acted to secure his parental rights
to the child immediately after Cara's pregnancy was known, de-
spite the fact that she had not told Daniel that he was Jessica's
father. 4 Calling this assertion "totally unrealistic,"' The Iowa Su-
preme Court affirmed the district court's finding that, under the
87. IOWA CODE § 600.3(2) (1993).
88. B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 240-41.
89. Id. at 245.
90. B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 247 (Snell, J., dissenting). In 1994, the Iowa legislature
adopted § 600A.9A(1), which provides:
Any biological parent who chooses to identify the other biological parent and who
knowingly and intentionally identifies a person who is not the other biological par-
ent in the written release of custody or in any other document related to the ter-
mination of parental rights proceedings is guilty of a simple misdemeanor.
1994 Iowa Legis. Serv. § 600A.9A (West).
91. B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 245.
92. IOWA CODE § 600.3(2) (1993).
93. B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 241 n.1. See IOWA CODE § 600A.8(3) (1993). IOWA CODE
§ 600A.2(17) (West Supp. 1994) defines abandonment as:
to permanently relinquish or surrender, without reference to any particular per-
son, the parental rights, duties or privileges inherent in the parent-child relation-
ship. The term includes both the intention to abandon and the acts by which the
intention is evidenced. The term does not require that the relinquishment or sur-
render be over any particular period of time.
94. B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 241 n.1.
95. Id.
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clear and convincing evidence standard, 6 Daniel had not aban-
doned Jessica.9 7 The court further noted that a finding of abandon-
ment would deprive Daniel of his constitutional right"8 to develop
a meaningful relationship with his daughter.9 9 Because Daniel's
rights to Jessica had not been legally terminated and the court did
not find grounds to terminate his rights under Iowa law, Jessica's
best interests were not considered. 100
Although the Michigan Supreme Court was able to rest its de-
cision in the DeBoers' appeal on Iowa law and the Iowa court's
decision concerning Peter Darrow's motion filed on behalf of Jes-
sica, the court examined Michigan law to determine whether Jes-
sica could initiate a custody proceeding on her own behalf. Darrow
urged the following: (1) the UCCJA bestows on children the right
to initiate such actions; (2) Jessica has a due process liberty inter-
est in her relationship with her "psychological parents," 10 1 the
DeBoers; and (3) Jessica's right to equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment has been violated, since children are
treated differently based on whether they are in the care of their
"psychological" or biological parents.102
The Michigan Supreme Court quickly dismissed the theory
arising from the Child Custody Act. The court refused to read the
Child Custody Act to allow an action on the child's behalf because
the Act consistently differentiates the adult parties from the child
and was designed to resolve disputes among the adult parties seek-
ing custody.10 3 The court seemed to chastise the DeBoers, calling it
a "fiction" that a two year-old might express a preference about
her custody, and suggesting that the DeBoers actually were impos-
ing on Jessica what they thought was in her best interests via the
96. See IowA CODE ANN. § 600A.8 (1992). This burden of proof reflects the Santosky
standard, which requires that parental unfitness must be found by a standard equal to or
greater than clear and convincing evidence. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 645, 769
(1982).
97. B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 246. In fact, the court felt so strongly to the contrary that it
remarked: "[V]irtually all of the evidence. . . suggests just the opposite." Id.
98. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
99. B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 241 n.1.
100. Id. at 245.
101. The concept of psychological parenthood is defined as "the mutual interaction be-
tween adult and child, which might be described in such terms as love, affection, basic trust,
and confidence." Alternatives to "Parental Right," supra note 9, at 158. This definition is
based on the work of Anna Freud and others, which eventually resulted in the publication of
Beyond The Best Interest of the Child in 1973. For a more detailed discussion of "psycho-
logical parenthood," see part I1.
102. In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 665 (Mich. 1993).
103. Id. at 665 n.44.
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next-friend procedure. 10 4
In response to Darrow's second and third legal theories, the
court used language that closely echoed the Iowa court's language,
emphasizing that the right of the natural parent to custody super-
sedes the child's interest in remaining with a non-parent custodian.
While acknowledging that children have a due process liberty in-
terest in their family life, the court insisted that those interests
were not independent of a child's biological parents' interests.105
The court continued by stating that "[t]he mutual rights of the
parent and child come into conflict only when there is a showing of
parental unfitness. . . despite the preferences of the child."10 The
court cited Michigan case law supporting its finding that Jessica's
interests were not actionable separate from her biological parents'
interests.1 07
The court responded to Darrow's equal protection claim by re-
lying on the parental rights doctrine. The court observed that
"children residing with their parents are not similarly situated to
those residing with non-parents,"'1 8 since the nature of their rela-
tionships were fundamentally different. 09 The court ultimately or-
dered the circuit court to establish a plan for the transfer of cus-
tody and to monitor and enforce the transfer process. 10
An appeal of the decision to the United States Supreme Court
proved fruitless. Denying the DeBoers' application for a stay of
custody, Justice Stevens maintained:
[n]either Iowa law, Michigan law, nor federal law authorizes unrelated per-
sons to retain custody of a child whose natural parents have not been found
to be unfit simply because they may be better able to provide for her future
and her education .... There is no valid federal objection to the conduct
or the outcome of the proceedings .... 1
104. Id. After noting the lack of case authority to support the next friend's position, the
court criticized this legal strategy, stating: "[it is clear that what is sought in this case is not
so much the recognition of a child's right to bring an action, but a procedure by which
persons like the DeBoers[] ... may circumvent those rules." Id.
105. Id. at 665.
106. Id. at 666.
107. Id. at 666-67.
108. Id. at 668.
109. The court distinguished between the foster family and the natural family:
The liberty interest in family privacy has its source.., not in state law, but in
intrinsic human rights, as they have been understood in this Nation's history and
tradition. Here, however, whatever emotional ties may develop between foster par-
ent and foster child have their origin in an arrangement in which the State has
been a partner in the outset.
Id. at 651 (quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845-46 (1977)).
110. Id. at 668.
111. DeBoer v. DeBoer, 114 S. Ct. 1 (1993).
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On Monday, August 2, 1993, Jessica was returned to her
birthparents, Cara and Daniel Schmidt, through a court-appointed
intermediary. The transfer took place two years and five months
after Cara and Daniel first sought to regain custody of Jessica.
II. IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: NATURE OR NURTURE?
We had different degrees of testimony... [b]ut every expert testified that
there would be serious traumatic injury to the child at this time." 2
Throughout the numerous proceedings that .marked the
DeBoers' fight to retain custody of Jessica, they urged a best inter-
ests of the child 113 determination. This legal standard soon became
the battle cry for the DeBoers' supporters, as well as the catch-
phrase most often used by the media to report on the case. 114
Where a child's best interests lie would seem to be the most logical
place to rest any custody decision, since the child has the greatest
stake in the result; yet, best interests hearings are often never held
in custody disputes. Frequently, before such a determination can
be made, the biological ties of one or both of the "natural" par-
ents1 5 must be overcome. So too, the Supreme Court of Michigan
could not consider Jessica's best interests in light of Daniel
Schmidt's biological link to her. The court characterized the tie
between Jessica and Daniel as "natural," but her relationship with
the DeBoers as merely "contractual." ' 6
Though the court ultimately rested its decision on the techni-
cal issues of jurisdiction and standing, the Michigan Supreme
Court clearly articulated its judicial preference for the "natural"
family over the "foster family." The court launched the substan-
112. Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d at 669 (Levin, J., dissenting) (quoting Circuit
Judge William Ager).
113. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., Joan Beck, Court Ruling Serves the Law, But Not the Child, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, April, 5, 1993, at All (arguing that law cares more about technicalities than the
interests of two-year-old Jessica); Anita Creamer, Taking Custody of Our Senses, SACRA-
hMnNro BEE, June 8, 1993, at Dl (asking what, in the context of child custody decisions
generally and in Jessica's case particularly, about the child's best interests); Gibbs, supra
note 30, at 44; Ellen Goodman, Taken From Those She Loves, WASH. POST, July 31, 1993, at
A21 (stating "how little the child's view is counted in the eyes of blind justice"); Mark
Patinkin, When Children Become Chattel, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, July 26, 1993, at 7B
(discussing how courts are treating children like property instead of giving their interests
precedence); Lynn Smith, A Birth Mother; It's Never in the Best Interest of Children to be
Bought, L.A. Tniss, Aug. 11, 1993, at El.
115. According to IOWA CODE ANN. § 600A.2(12) (West Supp. 1994): "Natural parent
means a parent who has been a biological party to the procreation of the child." Id.
116. In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 651 (Mich. 1993).
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tive portion of its opinion by quoting the Supreme Court's decision
in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families:1 7 "[n]o one would
seriously dispute that a loving and interdependent relationship
with an adult and a child in his or her care may not exist in the
absence of blood relationship."' 18 However, the court was quick to
add that there are limits to claims based on psychological relation-
ships. These limits are the "constitutionally recognized" interests
that derive from a blood relationship."19
Some experts have argued that natural parents "are credited
with an invariable, instinctively based positive tie to the child, al-
though this is frequently belied by evidence to the contrary." 20
Yet, the legitimacy of the biological tie is seldom rejected in the
judicial arena and has been likened to a property right,'2 ' making
the welfare of the child a secondary consideration. Professor Kath-
erine T. Bartlett has explained how custody litigation confirms this
view of parenthood: "[C]urrent legal thinking. . . causes us to fo-
cus on an individual parent's achievement, biological contribution,
and 'rights' and thereby conceive parenthood in individualistic,
possessory terms."'22
Though the delineation between natural and unnatural par-
ents represents a bright line for the courts, the child for whom the
court is making the custody determination has no conception of
biological ties and their implications, at least in the early years of
his or her development. 23 The child's emotional attachment does
not originate in "the physical realities of his conception and
birth,"24 but is a direct outgrowth of a connection with an adult
117. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
118. Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d at 651 (quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families, 431 U.S. 816, 843-44 (1977)).
119. Id.
120. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 17 (1973)
[hereinafter BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD].
121. In his lengthy dissent, Justice Charles Levin condemns the majority for treating
Jessica as if she were a "carload of hay" and focusing their analysis "on whether the biologi-
cal parents or persons acting as parents have the better 'legal right,' better legal title. . ....
Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d at 668, 670 (Levin, J., dissenting).
122. Katherine Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 337 (1988) (pro-
posing that the law of child custody be based on a view of parenthood as responsibility and
connection rather than possessiveness and rights).
123. According to adoption experts Brodzinsky, Schechter and Marantz, contrary to
what pop psychologists suggest, babies "do not emerge from the uterus bonded or attached
to their biological parents, nor do they look around and say 'Mama' to the first person
visible." DAvID BRODZINSKY ET AL., BEING ADOPTED: THE LIFELONG SEARCH FOR SELF 31-39
(1992). Though they do not deny the capabilities that newborns have been proven to display
in recognizing their mother's voice, breast milk, etc., the authors are quick to point out that
"recognition is not attachment." Id. at 33.
124. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 120, at 17.
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who meets his or her day-to-day physical and emotional
demands. 12 5
For the biological parents, the facts of having engendered,
borne, or given birth to a child produce an understandable sense of
preparedness for proprietorship and possessiveness. These consid-
erations carry no weight with children who are emotionally una-
ware of the events leading to their births. What registers in their
minds are the day-to-day interchanges with the adults who take
care of them and who, on the strength of these interchanges, be-
come parent figures to whom they are attached. 12 This concept of
"psychological parenthood" is the key to framing a legal argument
that a child's best interests require custody to continue with the
nonparents. Thus, the best interests standard intrinsically favors
the status quo, i.e., the parties in possession of the child.
A singular best interests determination took place throughout
the history of Jessica's case. Several expert witnesses testified in
the Washtenaw County Circuit Court that Jessica was certain to
suffer trauma if she were removed from the DeBoers. 27 On that
basis, the court held it was in Jessica's best interests to remain
with the DeBoers. This finding later was held immaterial.
While the presence or absence of biological ties may have been
a logical factor on which to base custody decisions in the past, the
widespread acceptance of "psychological" parenthood has under-
mined this rigid interpretation of family. Despite the support of
the psychiatric community and the overall success of adoption, the
legal system clings to a notion of family that stems from biology.
As Professor Elizabeth Bartholet explains:
The term family implies a group linked by blood ties: a married couple are
not really a family until they produce a child together; when people talk
about "starting a family," they refer not to the creation of a marital rela-
tionship but to the production of children. Only our blood relationships are
permanent .... 128
Because of this reverence for the biological link, adoption is
inherently surrounded by stigma and viewed as the last alternative
125. Id.
126. Id. at 12-13.
127. In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 669 (Mich. 1993) (Levin, J., dissenting)
(quoting Circuit Judge William Ager); see also Primetime Live: "Baby Anna"--An Update
on Baby Jessica (ABC television broadcast, Mar. 10, 1994). On this broadcast, experts were
shown testifying in the district court. The experts' predictions about the effect of a possible
transfer of custody ranged from a "very significant trauma in [Jessica's] life" to "[w]hatever
she has achieved developmentally, she'll probably go backwards." Id.
128. ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAmuY BoNDs: ADOPTION AND THE POLITICS OF PARENTING
169 (1993).
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both for birth parents and adoptive parents.129 This stigma is logi-
cally extended to any relationship that does not flow from the
traditional concept of family, i.e., those people who are linked by
blood. The courts view any relationship defined outside of biology
as inferior"0 and existing only at the tolerance of the state.131 This
inherent bias extends naturally to custody decisions and may ex-
plain the adherence to parental rights in this context. It may also
explain why parental rights and the best interests standards are
often construed as having dichotomous objectives and results. Yet,
an argument in favor of the child's best interests may not necessa-
rily exclude all consideration of biological ties.
A. Best Interests and Biology: Mutually Exclusive?
Because of the long tradition of viewing adoption as a solution to many
problems, professionals and lay people have had trouble accepting the pos-
sibility that the solution itself could at times be a problem."'2
While the bonds associated with psychological parenthood
have attained widespread recognition'33 since they were first iden-
tified, 13 biological ties cannot be ignored altogether. The approach
taken by the DeBoers and their numerous supporters seemed to
deny that biological heritage has any meaning. But adoption ex-
perts have discovered that adoptees experience loss from the very
fact that they are separated from their biological family," 5 a loss
they describe as "more pervasive, less socially recognized, and
more profound" than death or divorce.136
This sense of loss, even for those adoptees who are placed at
birth, is felt in the context of the adoptee's search for self, one of
the primary dimensions of psychological development. As David
Brodzinsky writes: "When you live with your biological family, you
129. Id. at 165.
130. Id. at 167. Professor Bartholet observes: "[b]lood strangers who rear and nurture
children are unreal, unnatural substitutes for the real thing." Id.
131. The Michigan Supreme Court emphasized the distinction between a foster family
and a natural family: "[w]hatever emotional ties may develop between foster parent and
foster child have their origins in an arrangement in which the state has been a partner from
the outset." In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 651 (Mich. 1993) (quoting Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977)).
132. BRODZINSKY Er AL., supra note 123, at 9.
133. See Peggy C. Davis, "There's a Book Out There . . .", An Analysis of Judicial
Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1539 (1987) (documenting the judiciary's
indiscriminate acceptance of this work in the context of custody disputes).
134. See, e.g., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 120.
135. See generally BRODZINSKY ET AL., supra note 123.
136. Id. at 9.
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have guideposts to help you along. You can see bits of your own
future reflected in your parents, pieces of your personality echoed
in your brothers and sisters."'31 For those that are adopted, there
are fewer clues to identity.
In addition to the "genealogical bewilderment" that affects the
search for self, coming to terms with the perceived rejection by
one's birth parents can also augment an adoptee's negative self-
perception. "Once children enter into a period of logical thought
• ..they realize that to have been 'chosen', they first had to have
come from somewhere-which meant that someone had to give
them away."'13 8 The anger that often accompanies this realization
can take two different directions, both of which have a negative
impact on a child. For a child who concludes that he or she was
"abandoned" or "rejected," the anger is most likely directed at the
birth parents; for a child who feels that he or she was "stolen" or
"bought," the anger is often directed at the adoptive parents.13 9
For children between the ages of six and eighteen, studies in-
dicate that adoption is a risk factor for certain problems such as
low self-esteem, poor academic progress, and certain destructive
behavior. 40 The increased vulnerability of adoptees to psychologi-
cal problems is largely due to their experience of loss. In light of
the potential risks associated with adoption, custody decisions that
emphasize biological ties seem at least lartially justified as being
in the child's best interests. Yet, the singular focus on the "rights"
of parents undermines arguments framed in biological terms, mak-
ing them vulnerable to attack from those who advocate the exclu-
sive use of the best interests standard-which centers instead on a
child's attachments. Thus, discussions of each standard are ex-
pressed in terms of either the parents' rights or the child's rights.
This Comment next examines both "black letter" standards and
one judicial attempt to temper the results that can emerge from
each extreme.
B. Best Interests Versus Parental Interests
While responding to a child's best interests seems to be an ob-
vious response to the difficult questions posed by custody disputes,
it is clearly a double-edged sword. In one respect, it may be the
only means of providing individualized justice for the child subject
to a custody proceeding. The best interests standard has been an
137. Id. at 13.
138. Id. at 71.
139. Id. at 78.
140. Id. at 9.
19951
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
improvement over custody rules that focus solely on the parent's
interests.'41 This standard "[f]orc[es] parents to articulate their
claims to children in terms of the child's welfare [and] expresses a
societal preference for protecting children over protecting adults, a
preference which, though not inevitable, is easily defended."' 42
However, such individualized determinations carry a substantial
risk of societal biases impacting the custody decision.
1. The Case of Baby Girl B. "The fundamental liberty inter-
ests of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of
their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been
model parents . . . . Even when blood relationships are strained,
parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable de-
struction of their family life. 1 43 On June 26, 1991, eighteen year-
old Gina Pelligrino was taken to a local Connecticut hospital after
a fainting spell. When hospital personnel informed her that she
was in active labor, she gave them false answers regarding her
name and personal information. After she gave birth, she briefly
checked on her child and fled the hospital. She returned home and
concealed what had happened from her parents and friends.1 44
On July 31, 1991, Gina's parental rights were terminated fol-
lowing a hearing.145 Gina was deemed to have received constructive
notice of the filing through publication in a New Haven register
pursuant to Connecticut law. 4 Approximately four months later,
141. Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's Perspec-
tives and the Law, 36 Axiz. L. R.v. 11, 55 (1994) (observing that, at its inception, the best
interests standard was viewed as enlightened and humane because it rescued children from
their status as marital property; concluding that the best interests standard is jurispruden-
tially unsound); see also Bartlett, supra note 122, at 303.
142. Bartlett, supra note 122, at 302-03.
143. In re Baby Girl B., 618 A.2d 1, 10 (Conn. 1992) (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 753 (1982)).
144. Id. at 4.
145. Id. at 5. The trial court found that it was in the child's best interests to waive the
one-year waiting period for termination of parental rights under Connecticut law. Specifi-
cally, Connecticut law provides: "The court may waive the requirement that one year expire
prior to the termination of parental rights if it finds from the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the child that such a waiver is necessary to promote the best interest of the
child." Id. at 5 n.4 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-112(c) (West 1992)).
146. See id. at 5 n.3. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-716(c) (1993) provides:
If the address of any person entitled to personal service is unknown. . . a judge
or clerk of the court shall order notice to be given by. . . publication at least ten
days before the date of the hearing. Any publication shall be in a newspaper of
general circulation in the place of the last-known address of the person to be noti-
fied . . .or if no such address is known, in the place where the termination has
been filed.
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after the expiration of the statutory appeal period following a judg-
ment terminating parental rights, Gina stepped forward to reclaim
her daughter 147 who already had been placed for adoption with an
approved couple. 48
The Connecticut trial court approved Gina's motion to re-
open the judgment terminating her parental rights. Under Con-
necticut law, jurisdiction to open a judgment terminating parental
rights prior to adoption is vested in the trial court. Despite the
expiration of the statutory period 49 and the baby's placement with
a couple approved for her adoption, she was returned to her biolog-
ical mother 150 who was living in a homeless shelter at the time of
transfer.151 The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's ruling in December 1994. The fact that the State of Con-
necticut would transfer an infant child from a secure home to the
uncertainty of life in a homeless shelter was hard to comprehend
outside the realm of law, and an enormous outcry ensued across
the state.. 52
Writing for the majority, Chief Judge Peters recognized the
importance of achieving justice for the individual. 153 "[T]he legisla-
ture has struck a balance between a strong policy interest in final-
ity of judgments terminating parental rights and an equally strong
147. Baby Girl B., 618 A.2d at 5.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 6; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-212a (West 1991), which provides
that "[a] civil judgment or decree rendered in the superior court may not be opened or set
aside unless a motion to open or set aside is filed within four months following the date on
which it is rendered . . . ." Id.
150. Baby Girl B., 618 A.2d at 7.
151. Constance Hays, Custody Reversal in Connecticut Pits the Public Against the
Courts, N.Y. TMEs, July 13, 1992, at B7; see generally Gibbs, supra note 30.
152. According to The New York Times, there were outraged letters to newspapers,
petitions urging the return of the baby to the preadoptive parents, calls to change the child-
welfare laws, and death threats against Gina Pelligrino. See Hays, supra note 151, at B7.
If the realities of Baby Girl B's situation were considered in the custody equation, it is
doubtful that she would ever have been returned to her natural mother. This was clearly a
case of legal line-drawing with the child ending up on the wrong side of the line. As Con-
necticut Mental-Health Commissioner Albert Jay Solnit remarked: "[t]he best interests of
the child were totally ignored. What was worshipped was the technicality of the law and the
mystique of blood ties." See Gibbs, supra note 30, at 48.
However, Gina's lawyer was quick to defend her client, dismissing the tide of popular
opinion against Gina as "another topic of public disgust." See Hays, supra note 167, at B7.
She explained that Gina needed public assistance because she quit her job to be with the
baby full-time. Id.
Ironically, the homeless shelter where Gina planned to take her infant daughter was
recommended by the Department of Children and Youth Services because it had a program
which taught child-rearing techniques. Id.
153. In re Baby Girl B., 618 A.2d 1, 20 (Conn. 1992).
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policy interest in doing justice in the individual case. 1 1 54 However
the individual to which he was referring was not the child in ques-
tion but the parent who had once abandoned her and then re-
claimed her.
2. Cultural Biases. Though consideration of the child's best
interests potentially allows each child to be placed in a home that
is best suited to his or her needs, there are strong arguments
against this standard. One argument of child welfare advocates is
that this standard leads to even less uniformity in custody deci-
sions, making the murky waters of adoptive parenting even less
clear.' 5 Even more disturbing is the ever-present danger that cul-
tural biases will affect custody decisions that should be entrusted
to judicial discretion alone. 56 As Katherine Bartlett observes:
[T]he best interests of the child is a highly contingent social construction.
Although we often pretend otherwise, it seems clear that our judgments
about what is best for our children are as much the result of political and
social judgments about what kind of society we prefer as they are conclu-
sions based upon neutral or scientific data about what is "best" for children.
The resolution of conflicts over children ultimately is less a matter of objec-
tive fact-finding than it is a matter of deciding what kind of children and
families-what kind of relationships--we want to have. 5"
Two cultural biases that have emerged from custody cases decided
under the best interests standard are class bias and life-style bias.
3. Class Bias. "[B]ecause they looked as if they'd just
stepped out of a Volvo ad, conventional wisdom believed the
DeBoers would be better parents." 158 One form of cultural bias
that permeated the custody battle for Jessica DeBoer is class bias.
Americans were overwhelmingly in favor of the DeBoers,59 causing
one to wonder whether the "proclaimed interest in Jessica's well-
being serves as camouflage for middle-class bias."' 60 In fact, it is
reasonable to conclude that a child who has been demoted in socio-
economic class is deprived of certain opportunities.161 Though this
154. Id.
155. Mnookin, supra note 10, at 262.
156. See, e.g., Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966).
157. Bartlett, supra note 122, at 303.
158. See Ingrassia & Springen, supra note 6, at 64.
159. Roberta DeBoer, From Start, Media Took Sides in Baby Jessica Case, TOLEDO
BLADE, Aug. 23, 1993, at 11A [hereinafter DeBoer, Media Took Sides]. Roberta DeBoer is a
columnist for the Toledo Blade, not Jessica's intended adoptive mother.
160. Id.
161. Cohen, supra note 2, at W9.
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bias is often subliminal to the onlooking public, it is a tension that
was recognized throughout the judicial history of Jessica's case.
The Iowa Supreme Court made it clear from the beginning of its
opinion that "courts are not free to take children from parents
simply by deciding [that] another home appears more advanta-
geous. ' 162 Yet this statement was made in the context of the pa-
rental right doctrine. If the court did not have a standard to follow
and was simply determining the child's best interests, no doubt the
economic positions of the adverse parties would influence the
decision.
A group of lawyers and adoptees felt that the controversy over
the "Baby B" decision 163 was fueled by class bias-a consensus
that the middle-class couple should have triumphed over the teen-
age welfare mother."' The fight between the DeBoers and the
Schmidts was portrayed in a similar manner: the educated, com-
fortable DeBoers versus the truck driver and dispatcher from the
Iowa backwater. 65
It is interesting to consider, as one journalist did, what the
reaction of the public would have been if Jessica's biological
mother had been something other than an Iowa truck dis-
patcher."8 6 "[H]ad Cara Clausen been a twenty-seven year-old in-
vestment banker who surrendered her baby for adoption without
legal or other counseling, I bet the media would have cried 'Stop,
thief!' "167 Indeed, it is often the economic disparity between com-
peting parties to a custody dispute that decides the outcome. Some
162. In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 241 (Iowa 1992) (quoting In re Burney, 259 N.W.2d
322, 324 (Iowa 1977)). The Supreme Court noted this language in its denial of an applica-
tion for a stay of the judgment. DeBoer v. DeBoer, 114 S. Ct. 1 (1993). The Supreme Court
of Michigan echoed these principles: "[it is a well-established principle of law that parents,
whether rich or poor, have the natural right to the custody of their children." In re Baby
Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 667 (Mich. 1993) (quoting Herbstman v. Shiftan, 108 N.W.2d
869, 872 (1961)).
163. See supra part II.
164. See Mark Pazniokas, Legislators Urged to Reject Changes Rooted in Emotional
Adoption Case, HARTFoRD CoURANT, Feb. 27, 1993, at C1.
165. See DeBoer, Media Took Sides, supra note 159; see also Primetime Live: "Baby
Anna"--An Update on Baby Jessica (ABC television broadcast, Mar. 10, 1994). Diane Saw-
yer, who conducted the interview, commented:
[t~he DeBoers were seen as more prosperous, better educated. They lived in a
college town. Even though the Schmidts, from Iowa farm country, in fact, had a
slightly higher income ... [w]hen the DeBoers sold their story for a T.V. movie,
they were the sophisticates ... [t]he Schmidts were held up for ridicule.
Id. Sawyer also reported that the DeBoers were portrayed in a made-for-television movie as
enjoying dinner in a French restaurant while the Schmidts were shown (falsely) living in a
trailer with hubcaps hanging across the front porch. Id.
166. DeBoer, Media Took Sides, supra note 159, at 11A.
167. Id.
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observers felt that a major thrust of the DeBoers' strategy was sim-
ply to drain the Schmidts' financial resources through legal costs
and eventually force them to give up.16 Writing for The Washing-
ton Post, Richard Cohen aptly summarizes the dangers of class
bias: "Having abandoned the firm handhold of the old standard
. . . we are heading down a slippery slope at the bottom of which
lurks an issue we Americans are reluctant to face: the awful reali-
ties and inequalities of wealth and class." 169
4. Lifestyle Bias. Though class bias may manifest itself sub-
tly in the context of a custody decision, a not-so-subtle brand of
social manipulation occurs when the morality of a custodial parent
is questioned. A recent decision that demonstrates this point in-
volved a Virginia woman and her son. Two year-old Tyler Doustou
was removed from his natural mother, Sharon Bottoms, and placed
in the custody of his maternal grandmother, Kay Bottoms who ini-
tiated the custody action. The sole reason that Sharon Bottoms
lost custody of her son was that she is a lesbian and lives with her
female lover, April Wade.
Circuit court Judge Buford Parsons, Jr., upheld a juvenile
court order which removed Tyler from Sharon's custody because
her relationship with Ms. Wade is "illegal, immoral and renders
her an unfit parent. 17 0 Judge Parsons relied on a 1985 state su-
preme court decision1 71 that held that it is not in a child's best
interests to award custody to a parent who carries on an active
homosexual relationship in the same residence as the child.17 2 In
that case, the court found "[tihe father's continuous exposure of
the child to his immoral and illicit relationship renders him an un-
fit and improper custodian as a matter of law. '173 Sharon's attor-
ney, Donald Butler, argued that his client's situation was distinct
from the decision on which Judge Parsons relied because that cus-
tody dispute involved one parent versus another parent, while
Sharon's case involved a non-parent versus a parent.174 However,
Judge Parsons reasoned that the "'extraordinary nature' of Bot-
toms' moral deficiency trumped any legal presumption" favoring
168. Cohen, supra note 2, at W9.
169. Id.
170. See Stephen Chapman, A Custody Decision That Poses a Danger to Every Par-
ent, CHI. TRm., Sept. 19, 1993., at 3.
171. Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985).
172. Id. at 691.
173. Id. at 694.
174. Interview with Donald Butler, Larry King Live (CNN television broadcast, Sept.
15, 1993).
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the biological parent.175 Interestingly, even though Kay Bottoms
had lived unmarried with a man for seventeen years while she
raised her children, the morality of her life was never questioned.
This irony caused one journalist to remark: "[tihat's rather selec-
tive Scripture reading, isn't it?" 176
Though the Bottoms' case did not involve a conflict between
birth parents and potential adoptive parents, the implications are
the same. A best interests of the child standard can be used to
validate certain lifestyles while condemning others as immoral.
When the subjective morality of a parent can be used in custody
decisions, everyone, apparently is at risk.
Ironically, one of the most famous misapplications of the best
interests standard, Painter v. Bannister,1" emerged from the juris-
diction that clung so strongly to biological ties in Jessica's case. In
1966, the Iowa Supreme Court held that it was in four year-old
Mark Painter's best interests to remain with his elderly grandpar-
ents rather than return to what it viewed as a "Bohemian" lifestyle
in San Francisco with his father and new stepmother. Mark was
placed temporarily with his maternal grandparents after his
mother and sister were killed in a car accident. Mark's father, Har-
old Painter, had not relinquished or abandoned him, nor was it
alleged that he was unfit. Harold simply needed some time to get
back on his feet after the tragic loss of his wife and daughter. The
court ignored a statutory presumption in favor of the father and
awarded custody to the grandparents. Though the court denied
that its decision was based on a "choice of one of two ways of
life,"178 the reasoning offered to support its decision belies this
denial:
The Bannister home provides Mark with a stable, dependable, conventional,
middle-class, midwest background and an opportunity for a college educa-
tion and profession, if he desires it. It provides a solid foundation and se-
cure atmosphere. In the Painter home, Mark would have more freedom of
conduct and thought with an opportunity to develop his individual talents.
It would be more exciting and challenging in many respects, but romantic,
impractical and unstable.17 9
As Henry Foster observed, the irony of this decision lies "in
the fact that the Iowa court in Painter blindly applied the so-
175. Judge: Lesbian is Unfit Parent, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 9, 1993, at 5.
176. Kathleen Parker, The Law Lacks Reason in '90s Custody Cases, ORLANDo SENT.,
Sept. 10, 1993, at El.
177. 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966).
178. Id. at 154.
179. Id.
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called best interests- rule and ignored the parental interest of the
father. Usually, it is the parental rights doctrine which is applied
inflexibly and without regard to the psychological consequences to
the child."'180 Decisions such as this demonstrate the dangers inher-
ent in legal standards that rely so heavily on judicial discretion.
Professor Jon Elster goes so far as to argue that even in cer-
tain situations where custody with a natural parent is likely to be
detrimental, the child's interests must be sacrificed for reasons of
public policy.181 He illustrates this assertion with the landmark
case of Palmore v. Sidoti.18 2 In Palmore, the Supreme Court over-
turned the decision of a Florida court, which took custody of a
young girl away from her mother who had married a man of a dif-
ferent race. The lower court proclaimed that its decision was in the
child's best interests, because the child inevitably would suffer
from social stigmatization if allowed to stay with her mother. The
Court rejected this reasoning, refusing to validate private biases
that lay outside of the law. As Professor Elster concludes, the rea-
soning against placing the child's interests above all other consid-
erations in situations such as these "will probably be accepted by
most defenders of the best interest standard, as the kind of excep-
tion that can arise to the best-grounded principles." 188
C. Can There Be Compromise?
Then the king said, 'Bring me a sword.' He then gave an order: 'Cut the
living child in two and give half to one and half to the other.'1 8'
While the battle between those who advocate nurture and
those who believe in nature promises to rage for some time, some
courts are utilizing innovative techniques to bridge the gap be-
tween interests that are often portrayed as diametrically opposed:
those of the adult parties to a custody action and the best interests
of the child. In one Addison County, Vermont, family court deci-
sion, custody of nine month-old Peter was split between his adop-
tive mother and his biological father. 85 Though full physical cus-
tody was awarded to the mother, biological father Daniel Harriman
will have visitation rights and a say in his son's upbringing.8' This
180. Foster, supra note 8, at 4.
181. Elster, Solomonic Judgments, supra note 10, at 26-28.
182. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
183. Elster, Solomonic Judgments, supra note 10, at 26.
184. 1 Kings 3:24-25.
185. Sally Johnson, Adoption's Tangled Web; "Unique" Pact Forged in Custody Battle
in Vermont is All Too Rare, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1993, at A13.
186. Id.
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Solomon-like solution to what was a highly-emotional dispute
presents a marked contrast to the often all-or-nothing results
achieved in most custody decisions . 7 However, it should be noted
that this unique settlement was solely due to Mr. Harriman's
acquiescence. 188
Mr. Harriman was estranged from his wife, 'who was living
with another man at the time of Peter's conception. Like Cara
Clausen-Schmidt, Angela Harriman lied about the identity of the
father. Richard and Donna McDurfee had raised Peter from the
day after his birth. Two months after Peter was born, Mr. Harri-
man stepped forward to make his claim to the child. According to
Mr. Harriman's lawyer, Peter Langrock, his client's rights were se-
cure from the outset because he was not only the biological father
but also was married to the biological mother when the child was
conceived. Thus, "Harriman's rights as a legal father were estab-
lished by marriage . . . . [T]he law is absolutely clear on that
point."18 9
Despite this legal advantage, Daniel Harriman considered the
trauma to Peter of taking him away from the people he had lived
with from his birth. 90 Rather than appeal, which would have pro-
longed the pain for everyone involved, the adoptive parents con-
cluded that they would return the child if they lost the first round
of the custody dispute in family court.' 91
As Mr. Harriman's lawyer pointed out, the principles underly-
ing a custody decision are not that different from arrangements
made in the context of a marital separation. 92 "It really isn't all
that different than a separation agreement in which the mother
retains physical custody but shares legal custody."'' 93 Even the
child's name reflects the equity of the settlement; Judge Edward
Cashman's order requires that the baby be named Peter Elliott
Harriman McDurfee. 94
Compromise solutions are a clear and welcome departure from
the winner-take-all nature of an adversarial legal system, and from
decisions that express themselves exclusively in terms of either
parents' or children's rights. These solutions consider both biologi-
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. A Familiar Custody Case, a Different Decision, N.Y. TmsS, Aug. 29, 1993, § 1, at
28 [hereinafter A Familiar Custody Case].
190. For Once The Baby Won, N.Y. Tnmns, Sept. 1, 1993, at A18; see also Judith
Gaines, Unique Adoption Ruling, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 21, 1993, at 1.
191. A Familiar Custody Case, supra note 189, at 28.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Pact is Reached in Vermont Adoption Case, N.Y. TnmEs, Aug. 23, 1993, at A12.
1995] 609
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
cal and psychological ties between parents/nonparent guardians
and the child, both of which are important to future development.
However, the prospects for concession often appear unattrac-
tive. That was particularly true for Roberta and Jan DeBoer who,
understandably, were unwilling to leave the custody bargaining ta-
ble with less than what they started with, i.e., sole custody of Jes-
sica. Yet, a compromise decision also would have avoided the all-
or-nothing prospects of a court battle. The DeBoers would still
have contact with the child they cherished, the Schmidts would
have been assured that they would be a part of their daughter's
life, and Jessica would have the benefit of two families that love
her.
III. MODERN MORAL SCRIPTS
Perhaps what is most striking about the Jessica DeBoer cus-
tody case is that, though Cara and Daniel Schmidt had won every
legal battle in Iowa and both Michigan appellate decisions, public
opinion was overwhelmingly against them. While the widespread
prejudices harbored for Cara and Dan Schmidt may stem from
lifestyle and class biases, these biases should not be considered
alone. In fact, the subtle intertwining of perceived class inferiority
and the "moral offenses" that Cara and Daniel committed worked
in concert to cloud the legal issues that confronted the courts and
sway public opinion against the birth couple.
Not only were the Cara and Daniel "biological aggressors" try-
ing to take Jessica from Roberta and Jan DeBoer, but they had
made some mistakes along the way. Most notably, Cara had falsely
named Scott Seefeldt as Jessica's father. But even though Cara
had erred in certain respects, an examination of her actions in con-
text renders her mistakes less fatal than the media and public per-
ceived them to be.
A. The Adoption Mandate
I am an unwed mother who kept her child. And I fear no hell after death,
for I've had mine here on earth... hell hath no punishment like the treat-
ment people give a 'fallen woman.'1 95
Although the social scorn reflected-and obviously felt-in
this unwed mother's 1958 letter may not be as prevalent today as
it was thirty years ago, the stigma attached to unwed pregnancy is
195. Ric= SOLINGER, WAKE Up LITLE SUSm: SINGLE PREGNANCY AND RACE BEFORE
Roe v. Wade 33 (1992) (quoting Letters, LADIES HoME J., Mar. 4, 1958, at 53).
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far from removed. Cara Clausen-Schmidt admittedly feared sham-
ing her family in tiny Blairstown, Iowa (population 672), by keep-
ing her illegitimate child.198 The stark moral code of rural Iowa can
best be understood in light of the post-war adoption mandate, pre-
scribed for unwed white females in the post-World War II years. 97
During the post-War decades, adoption emerged as the alter-
native for white unmarried mothers regardless of social position.198
The post-War years began a trend during which the "demand" for
white infants far exceeded their "supply."19 This trend continues
and has intensified today.200 In this era before Roe v. Wade, single,
pregnant females were considered deviants-damned as either
mothers with no rights or females with no right to be a mother.20 1
Surrendering an infant for adoption to a "good" home was viewed
as rehabilitative for the unwed mother, since such surrender would
restore her future prospects "to become properly married. 2
0 2
White, unwed mothers were contributors to the white, middle-class
family imperative in a dual sense: as (1) providers of babies to in-
fertile couples and, after relinquishing the infant, (2) creators of
their own "proper" families.203 Thus adoption was viewed as a so-
lution from every angle; adoptees were shielded from the stigma of
illegitimacy, adoptive parents were spared the heartache of infertil-
ity, and birth mothers were afforded a second chance at a "respect-
able" life.
Though unwed motherhood generally has been socially ac-
cepted in the American society of the 1990s, pressure on white fe-
males to relinquish their babies and prejudices against those who
do not is still very real. Birthparents who relinquish their children
in hopes of offering them a better life often are considered heroes.
Judge William Ager of the Michigan Circuit Court told Cara and
Daniel Schmidt that they too would be "heroes" if they would only
give up their fight for Jessica.204 In contrast, those who keep their
children when deemed less than fit by social, if not legal, stan-
196. Ingrassia & Springen, supra note 6, at 62.
197. See generally SOLINGER, supra note 195.
198. See id. at 31 (suggesting that adoption was "the largest single source of adoptable
infants").
199. Id. at 154 ("By the mid-1950s approximately one in ten marriages were involunta-
rily childless, the illegitimacy rate not high enough to meet the demand.").
200. It has been estimated that the number of parents seeking healthy infants has ex-
ceeded the supply by 40 to 1. See Gibbs, supra note 30, at 48.
201. See SOLINGER, supra note 195, at 3.
202. Id. at 154.
203. Id.
204. Primetime Live: "Baby Anna"-An Update on Baby Jessica (ABC television
broadcast, Mar. 10, 1994).
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dards, are considered selfish.
Those most likely influenced by these arguments are mothers
who lack the financial resources to keep their children after carry-
ing them full-term. In our consumption-oriented society, these
women are most likely to be taken advantage of by eager adoptive
couples. In Cara's case, the transfer of the infant occurred without
the benefit of legal or psychological counseling.
If Cara herself had been financially able to care for Jessica, at
least to the same level as the Roberta and Jan DeBoer, society may
have absolved Cara for her sins. 205 Her indiscretion in falsely nam-
ing Scott Seefeldt as Jessica's father may have been dismissed as
an understandable by-product of her fragile, post-partem state.
Unfortunately for Cara, she did not possess the redeeming quality
needed to justify her position, so she was labeled instead as deceit-
ful and selfish for depriving Jessica of what was perceived as a
"better life" and the advantages that would accompany it.
B. Earth Mother Versus Fallen Woman
America has this terribly biased opinion that all adoptive parents are saints
and all birthparents are trash.2 6
Having changed her mind about relinquishing her child and,
unable to afford the opportunities that Roberta and Jan DeBoer
apparently were able to provide, Cara Schmidt assumed the vil-
lainous role. This role was juxtaposed to pure image of Roberta,
who was unable to have children because she had contracted an
infection on her honeymoon which rendered her sterile. The fact
that a woman would give up her child at all places her in a position
to be scorned as one who would commit an act so unnatural. Ironi-
cally, upon seeing Jessica for the first time, Roberta DeBoer re-
portedly exclaimed: "You are so beautiful. How could she have
given you up.'"207 The media, acutely aware of this express tension
between the birth mother and the adoptive mother, seized the op-
portunity to join the battle. The "unbiased" reports weighed heav-
ily in favor of the DeBoers.
Some of the headlines, published following the Michigan Su-
preme Court's decision and during the pendency of an appeal to
the Supreme Court, demonstrate the media drama that pitted
"earth mother" Roberta DeBoer against "fallen woman" Cara
205. Indeed, out-of-wedlock parenthood has become rather "chic" for those occupying
the mid-to-upper social strata.
206. Ingrassia & Springen, supra note 6, at 62.
207. Franks, supra note 29, at 57.
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Schmidt. "Court Ruling Serves The Law, But Not The Child"; 0 s
"Defending Mommy Dearest";20 9  "Taking Custody Of Our
Senses"; 210 "Parental Rights That Wrong Children" 21 1 these were
just some of the headlines that displayed a sense of disgust at the
decision that returned Jessica to her biological parents. In print
and on the nightly news, the story of the DeBoers and the
Schmidts was much easier to tell, and much easier to sell, if it was
told in black-and-white terms. The "earth mother versus the fallen
woman" packaging simplified a complex issue. And, though it did
not ultimately affect the judicial outcome, the media's interpreta-
tion of the story made the DeBoers the favorites in the court of
public opinion.
The tendency to assign blame in a custody dispute goes be-
yond the media's need for a headline. In the nineteenth century, a
fault-based presumption was used to determine custody awards. It
was thought that "children will be best taken care of and in-
structed by the innocent party" '212 to a divorce. The fault-based
presumption was designed to serve the best interests of the child;
however, the overtones of compensatory and retributive reasoning
were undeniably present.
John Elster notes that while the formal identification of victim
and wrongdoer is no longer part of custody adjudication, underly-
ing perceptions can effect legal decisions just the same. "The idea
that the "innocent" . . . party. . . has a special right to custody,
and ... the "guilty" party should be punished by being denied
custody, has largely been eliminated from the law, but is sure to
live on in the minds of judges . ,,2.I This apparently natural
tendency to assign blame in the context of custody decisions may
explain in part why Cara and Daniel Schmidt inevitably were por-
trayed as villains while Roberta and Jan DeBoer were esteemed as
blameless victims.
208. Joan Beck, Court Ruling Serves The Law, But Not The Child, ORLANDO SENT.
TRIB., Apr. 5, 1993, at All.
209. Mary McGrory, Defending Mommy Dearest, WASH. POST, July 25, 1993, at Cl.
210. Anita Creamer, Taking Custody of Our Senses, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 8, 1993, at
Di.
211. Elizabeth Bartholet, Parental Rights That Wrong Children, SACRAMENTO BEE,
July 17, 1993, at B7.
212. Elster, supra note 10, at 8 (citing Mnookin, supra note 10, at 234 (quoting JOEL
BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 518, 520 (1852))).
213. Id. at 30.
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IV. CONCLUSION
I must confess, that I, too, began this Comment with the im-
age of "sinful" birthparents and "saintly" prospective adoptive
parents burned clearly in my mind. Yet, as the facts behind the
headlines revealed themselves, the clarity of first impression was
gone. As Cara and Daniel Schmidt seemed less blameworthy and
increasingly justified in their actions, my natural reaction was to
turn tail and indict the DeBoers. How can anyone claim to re-
present a child's best interests if the legal machinery for making
the claim works against that very interest?214 Not surprisingly, this
approach was equally unsatisfying.
Although the DeBoers lengthened the litigation process and
increased Jessica's risk of trauma, the appeals and custody stays
they secured were allowed by law and it would be perverse to fault
them for making use of every legal avenue available. Unable to
blame either party, I have settled for a more complete understand-
ing of the custody dispute that became known as the battle for
Baby Jessica. Although this reality should not be shocking, neither
the birthparents nor the custodians were blameless in the dispute,
nor was either couple unfit to be Jessica's parents.
One of the difficulties unique to custody adjudication is that it
renders a decision about the future.21 5 Lawyers and judges usually
are concerned with rendering a judgment based upon past actions
and events. In custody adjudication, past events and actions are
evaluated in an attempt to make a prediction about the future.21
How can one ever evaluate what might have happened if the other
party had been awarded custody? Or whether the choice that was
made actually served the child's best interests?
Jessica and the life that she builds with her new family is
214. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, which began
drafting a Uniform Adoption Act in 1951, has renewed its efforts to produce a draft version
of the Act, which may have provided procedural safeguards to prevent disputes like those
over Jessica. Carol McHugh, Experts: Adoption Contests Not Common-But Risks Are,
CH. DAILy L. BULL., Aug. 30, 1993, at 3. Professor Joan Hollinger, the reporter for the Con-
ference's drafting committee, stated that under the draft provisions of the Uniform Adop-
tion Act, the best interests of the child would be considered, but not to the exclusion of the
parents' rights. Id. To protect the rights of biological parents, an attorney for the prospec-
tive adoptive parents would not be allowed to obtain consent to an adoption or relinquish-
ment of parental rights, like the consent obtained in Jessica's case. Id. Birth parents could
relinquish their rights only to a neutral party. Id. Though the chance of the Uniform Adop-
tion Act being finalized in a relatively short period of time is unlikely, id., at least it is a
positive step toward addressing the inherent tension between the stringent rights of biology
and the manipulable standard which urges that the best interests of the child be paramount.
215. Foster, supra note 8, at 3.
216. Id.
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likely to come under a great deal of scrutiny. Proponents from
both sides will be evaluating her existence in terms of the decision
that returned her to her biological parents. If she is relatively suc-
cessful, those supporting parental rights will declare the Michigan
Supreme Court's decision correct. If she falls short of some pro-
posed ideal, those that support the best interests standard will
pronounce it erroneous. Either way, the true impact of this deci-
sion on her life is a question of perspective.

